

A World Security Community of democratic nations

Project Description

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Synopsis

How might we realistically develop an effective global governance model to cope with the global catastrophic risks of political violence? Following the successful strategy which led to the establishment of the European Union, we propose as a first step the establishment of a World Security Community (WSC). The WSC would be a global defense alliance opened to any nation in the world committed to democracy, human rights and international law. Any nation meeting a set of agreed criteria as a democracy could qualify to join the Community as a member. Acting strictly in conjunction with the Security Council, the new Community would form a powerful new force for peace and security in the world, first to protect its members, then to support the United Nations' peacebuilding missions. Working alongside the OECD, which should also deepen collaboration among democracies on global economic, social and environmental policies, WSC will lay the foundations for our ultimate vision of a democratic world federation able to deal with all global catastrophic risks.

Introduction

The Global Challenges Foundation (GCF) has listed a number of major global catastrophic risks which threaten our global collective future at the present time. It has chosen to initially focus its work on three global catastrophic risks: climate change, other large-scale environmental damage, and politically motivated violence. This proposal focuses on political violence, but we also discuss how it could help with other global catastrophic risks.

A conventional war between any of the nuclear powers¹ would engulf other countries and be tremendously costly, both directly in terms of lives lost and destroyed property, and indirectly by causing global financial and economic crises, environmental disasters, and mass migrations. More worryingly, such a war would substantially increase the likelihood of the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, which could kill a substantial fraction of the world population if not all of it, and set civilization back centuries. Cyber warfare could be equally catastrophic, and even more likely.² Three years ago former Secretaries of State Albright, Kissinger and Schultz stated that the world had never been so unstable since World War II (Taylor 2015). Since then, not a month has gone by without further incidents worsening the relationships among nuclear powers.³ In such a confrontational environment, it may only be a matter of time until the inevitable accident or miscalculation occurs (Tucker 2017).

Our proposal also helps reduce other forms of political violence including civil wars. They have pushed the number of forcibly displaced people to a record of 68.5 million people or 1% of humanity (Edwards 2018), which has itself become a significant source of instability. We recognize that war is not the only source of insecurity (Durch 2018), but it is our focus here.

The GCF recognizes that global governance is at the heart of solutions to global catastrophic risks. Equally true is that geopolitics (understood as nations' competition for power) is at the heart of global governance, and the balance of military power is at the heart of geopolitics. The quality of the relationships among major powers shapes the effectiveness of global governance. For the past decade, global governance has been in a tail spin, reflecting the growing antagonism among some of the nuclear powers.⁴ In the short to medium term, lowering the threat of war among them would not only reduce the risk of use of weapons of mass destruction, it would also improve the effectiveness of global governance to deal with all global catastrophic risks.

In the long term, our proposal also paves the way for the ultimate answer to all global catastrophic risks, which lies in some form of world federation where our representatives can sit down together and decide binding and enforceable international laws. In that we agree with other working groups; our only difference lies in the route recommended for reaching this ultimate objective. The Global Governance and San Francisco Promise working groups advocate the route of wholesale UN reform; the Together First group supports incremental reform. UN reform is the most obvious route, and one which we recommend the GCF should certainly continue to pursue. But moving all 193 UN member-states is a tremendous challenge in the face of the hostility that exists between some of them.

Our proposal lies along a different route, a stage by stage evolutionary path following the example set by Jean Monnet and his collaborators in Europe. A smaller group of countries could form a community of democracies, which could incubate accountable institutions to deal with global problems and incrementally expand to the entire world. We believe that success is much more likely using this practical and realistic strategy.

The next section develops this approach to global governance reform. The following one describes in detail our proposal for a community of democracies consisting of a World Security Community (WSC) supported by a reformed Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). We then demonstrate how our proposals would help cope first with political violence, and then with other global catastrophic risks. We follow with an implementation section discussing the possible sequencing and legal mechanisms for the adoption of our proposals, an advocacy section presenting a high-level strategy for alliance-building and constituency-building to get our proposals adopted. We finish with some brief conclusions.

Our Approach

The United Nations set clear rules to prevent war and the global catastrophic risks it entails: military force is to be used in self-defense only, and disputes must be settled by the International Court of Justice. When states do not abide by these rules, the UN Security Council must step in, can authorize sanctions or the use of force against aggressors, and set the terms of conflict settlement. The problem is of course that the Council's five permanent members themselves commit aggressions directly or through allies, and use their vetoes to block UN resolutions that undermine their interests. Ideally the United Nations would be reformed, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice made compulsory (i.e., binding), the vetoes abolished, and a UN army created enabling national disarmament. However, that is not going to happen in the foreseeable future primarily because some national governments deeply distrust each other and would not gamble their security on unproven global institutions, but also because powerful states and particularly the permanent five do not want to relinquish their power. We propose an alternative approach.

Europe has shown the way! World War II was the fifth major conflict between France and Germany in 200 years, and resulted in around 55 million deaths, 3% of the entire world's population at the time. European leaders were determined it must never happen again, and recognised that the way to prevent it was to integrate the nations of Europe.

Jean Monnet and his colleagues such as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Paul-Henri Spaak, Alcide de Gasperi, Henry Brugmans and Altiero Spinelli found the right strategy for Europe. They started from a smaller group of 'progressive' states to establish the European Coal and Steel Community, uniting the industries which provided the 'sinews of war'. The Community then evolved step by step, Treaty by Treaty, to become the present European

Union. For many the ultimate objective was a European Federation. Europe has still not reached that final goal, but the European Union is the most outstanding example of nations willingly surrendering elements of sovereignty and uniting for the common good. There will almost certainly never again be a war between France and Germany!

Our proposal follows this template. Ideally, we need some form of democratic world federation, which would make binding laws to deal with global catastrophic risks and other global problems. We believe that concerned world citizens should work steadily and consistently towards this ultimate long-term goal wherever they can (Cabrera 2017).

A difficult question is: how do we get there from here? World federalists have been grappling with this problem ever since World War II (Wittner 1993, Raskin 2017, WFM-IGP). They have mostly concentrated on campaigning for reform of the United Nations, only to be stymied by the rigid UN Charter. One of the most lively current initiatives on this front is the Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (CEUNPA, Leinen and Bummel 2018).

Uniting seven billion people in nearly two hundred countries – each jealous of its sovereignty – is an enormous task. Like climbing Mount Everest, it will not be achieved in a single giant bound. We will only get there gradually, through a series of base camps (Yuncker 2018). In the Schuman Declaration (1950), the founding document of the European Union, it is stated that “Europe will not be built in a day, or according to a single plan.” The same applies to the global system of governance.

On the global stage, the integration process should start with the democracies (Hamer 1998). To guard against autocracy and abuse of power, and to preserve the liberty and equality of all its citizens, any world federal government must be chosen by means of free and fair elections, with guaranteed freedom of organized groups to stand in opposition to the government in power. Democracy is the only form of government with a ‘safety valve’, whereby the people can replace the government if it is doing a bad job. Furthermore, there are more practical reasons for restricting membership to democratic states, such as the facts that democracies are generally more peaceful and less prone to internal conflict, as documented by the Global Peace Index (IEP 2017),⁵ and that democracies provide their citizens freedom of association and hence freedom to build deeper transnational bonds than government-to-government relationships.

We believe that the first step in the evolution of a democratic world federation could be the establishment of a World Security Community of democratic nations, which could itself embrace today’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other existing defense alliances such as the Australia, New Zealand and US alliance (ANZUS) or Latin America’s Rio Treaty. That security community could work in tandem with the OECD, which also fosters cooperation among democracies and is better equipped to deal with other global catastrophic risks. A brief historical account of similar ideas can be found in Appendix A.

The time seems now ripe for such an idea. While populists and nationalists have held the initiative recently, a counter-movement exemplified by President Macron is beginning to emerge. There is a clear sense that both democracy and the rules-based world order are threatened, and that the populist and nationalist alternatives are disastrous. Can national democracy survive economic globalization (Kuttner, 2018)? Our response is that we need global democracy to cope with the global catastrophic risks which threaten us all (Jacobs 2007).

A common objection to our approach is that non-member states of the new Community may feel excluded, and suspicious of the motives behind it. Some would view both NATO and the

OECD as instruments of Western imperialism, for instance. If the Community interfered in their affairs, they would feel resentful, and would tend to regard the Community as an 'enemy'. Thus it would be important to make overtures to non-members. It should be emphasized that membership of the Community is open to all countries, provided only that they satisfy suitable criteria for democratic governance and peaceful relations with their neighbours.

A related objection is that the Community might be seen as competing with the role of the United Nations, in that both would be global security organizations. It will be important to demonstrate that the Community would function in a manner complementary to the United Nations, rather than competing with it. The Community should only intervene in a non-member-state at the behest of the UN Security Council. The forces at the Community's disposal would then provide powerful reinforcement to the decisions of the Security Council.

A third objection might be that requiring democracy of new members is tantamount to forcing Western ideas of government onto what is meant to be a global community. That is not a sustainable argument. Government "of the people, by the people, for the people" is a universal concept, not a purely Western one, and the thriving democracies in Japan and India are convincing examples of this truth. As more non-Western countries and countries from the 'global South' join the Community, these fears should be allayed.⁶

Our Proposal

Our proposal for a World Security Community of democratic nations then consists of the following basic elements:

- (1) The Community would be a defense alliance ("an attack on one is an attack on all") and its primary mission would be to guarantee the security and freedom of all its members. Its secondary mission would be to act as their peacebuilding and peacekeeping arm in the wider world, under the aegis of the United Nations.
- (2) The Community would be a global organization with its membership opened to all states committed to democracy, human rights and international law. The membership requirements would be as follows:
 - a. Human rights: In Appendix B, we have studied different models of democracy and human rights requirements for membership in intergovernmental organizations and their enforcement mechanisms: NATO, OECD, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, European Union, Council of Europe, Organization of American States, and African Union. We conclude that either the European Union or the Council of Europe models would be the most adequate because of their enforcement mechanisms. In either case, WSC's founding members would define a list of human rights required to be a member, and candidate members would need to figure out for themselves whether they are ready to adopt them or not. In the short term, most of the 87 nations rated as 'fully free' by Freedom House should be eligible without major institutional reforms, for example (Freedom House 2018). In the long run, it is envisaged that the Community would become universal, as democracy eventually spreads to the rest of the globe.⁷
 - b. International law: Community members should not commit aggression; they should use force only in collective self-defense, or when authorized (and indeed called for) by the UN Security Council, in compliance with Articles 2.4 and 51 of the UN Charter.

Community members should also accept the binding jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to settle disputes with external states peacefully.

- c. Military readiness: Members should contribute their fair share to the collective defense burden by spending a certain amount on their military according to a formula set from time to time by the Community according to the evolving geopolitical environment. Their armed forces should pass an assessment of inter-operationality with other members' armed forces carried out by the Community's Secretariat.

The detailed structure of the Community can only be determined by the commission set up to draft the new Treaty establishing the new organization. But elements we would like to see include:

- (3) Avoid the dysfunctional decision-making system that plagues most intergovernmental organizations including NATO by adopting a 'qualified-majority' voting system, preferably at all levels, as advocated in the past by senior military officials (Jones 2007, Naumann 2007). Such a scheme has been used by the European Union. A more detailed discussion of these ideas is given in Appendix C.
- (4) To ensure compliance with its rules, the Community should have the power to suspend the voting rights or even expel members that fail to meet the membership requirements or implement decisions.
- (5) The Community should also channel a fraction of its funds to new peacebuilding facilities, to help prevent future conflicts, and reconstruct failed states after previous conflicts, in conjunction with the new Peacebuilding Commission at the United Nations.
- (6) Structure the organization with prototype organs of democratic governance, following the pattern pioneered in Europe:
 - (a) The Community should have a supreme Council of heads of state or government meeting periodically to approve broad Community policy.
 - (b) The Community should have a Council of Ministers from the member states meeting regularly to prepare and approve detailed policy decisions, as in Europe.
 - (c) The Community should have a Secretariat of civil servants, whose role would be to oversee the day-to-day operations of the Community, and prepare detailed policy proposals for approval. It could be headed by a Commission on the European model.
 - (d) The Community should establish a Parliamentary Assembly, as the nucleus for an eventual elected parliament.
 - (e) A Court needs to be established to settle differences over the interpretation of the founding treaty, and arbitrate any intractable disputes between the member states.

In addition, we propose three institutional reforms to the OECD in order to deepen relationships among democracies and contribute to solutions to global catastrophic risks other than political violence:

- (7) The OECD should revise its membership requirements and accession process, such that its membership largely but not necessarily entirely overlaps with that of WSC.

- (8) The OECD should start convening summits of its members' heads of state concurrently with the WSC to coordinate their economic, social and environmental policies.
- (9) The OECD should channel funds to foster development in the less developed member states under the principle of 'solidarity' established by the European Union.

Coping with Global Catastrophic Risks of Political Violence

This section argues how the global governance model we have just presented will help decrease the likelihood of major interstate wars, and hence reduce the global catastrophic risks of use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well as cyber and space warfare. We also argue that our proposal will help to cope with civil wars as well, although we do not claim that it will eliminate them entirely in the immediate future.

Our proposal constitutes a plan to achieve comprehensive and sustainable international peace within a generation or two. The WSC would constitute a powerful island of peace and security in a turbulent world, which would refrain from aggression and hence not threaten those on the outside, and which would incrementally expand to the entire world by attraction, not coercion, until hopefully one day all nations choose to embrace it. Meanwhile, we argue in the next sub-sections that the WSC will increase security for all states: founding members (assuming the scenario discussed in the Implementation section where founding members are the current NATO members), new members, and non-members.

WSC will increase the security of its founding members

The keystone of WSC members' security is dissuasion. The Community must have the military capabilities to win any war, such that no one would contemplate attacking any of its members in the first place.

Expanding the Community will increase the security of founding members thanks to the additional military capabilities that will be brought to the alliance. Using defence spending as a proxy for power, NATO currently spends just under half of the world's total, compared to a little over 15% for Russia and China combined. Adding the United States' Rio Treaty allies (sixteen Latin American countries) and US bilateral treaty allies (four Asian-Pacific countries), for example, would bring another 9% of global defence spending under WSC structures (SIPRI 2018). A bigger WSC will allow its members to realize synergies and economies of scale that will increase defence effectiveness at lower cost. In addition to growing hardware and manpower, the Community would also foster intelligence sharing and joint threat analysis and contingency planning.

However, that extra capacity will only be valuable if the growing alliance continues to be cohesive – if the pledge of “all for one, one for all” remains credible. WSC members should stay committed to each other primarily because it will be in their own interest. Not defending other WSC members would destroy the dissuasive power of the WSC. It is nevertheless necessary to solidify the glue that will bind the Community together with a strong framework of rules. Our proposal addresses issues that already undermine NATO's cohesion and that would become more challenging as the number and diversity of members expands:

- Conflicts among member-states (e.g. territorial dispute between Turkey and Greece). The compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice will provide a peaceful way to resolve disputes among members.

- Conflicts within member-states (e.g. Kurdish rebellion in Turkey): The human rights membership requirements will reduce the risk that internal conflicts escalate into civil war.
- Worldviews growing apart (e.g. Turkey growing more authoritarian): Again, the membership requirements and sanctions against existing members that violate them will ensure that members continue to share the same values.
- Foreign policy disagreements (e.g. transatlantic rift about Iraq war): WSC will focus on defending its own territory; external operations will follow UN leadership.
- Free riding (e.g. Trump Administration's current criticism of allies): A burden sharing rule for defense spending and possible sanctions will end free riding and rebalance power within the alliance.

One critique of our proposal is that the WSC commitment to non-aggression could harm its members' security. The prevailing view in America is that the multipolar world which we live in is unpredictable, and unpredictability calls for 'leaving all options on the table': America should keep the policy to use force unilaterally if necessary to protect national security (Obama 2015). However, necessity or "last resort" is in the eye of the beholder. Any illegal use of force sows the seeds of revenge and future wars. President Putin's message to the West shows how the United States' bending of international law has destroyed trust and incited worse behavior on the part of Russia (Putin 2013). Because the United States has the most powerful military in the world, it ought to abide by the highest standard of compliance with international law. For when the top dog itself bends the rules, it foments cynicism and self-righteous wrongdoing on the part of the underdogs.

The main reason invoked to 'leave all options on the table' is to prevent nuclear proliferation. Both Iran and North Korea are currently under US threat. But leaving all options on the table does not turn out to buy much room for manoeuvre anyway to prevent nuclear proliferation.⁸ Almost all countries can be dissuaded from acquiring the bomb through sanctions. Those that can't are likely to be armed to the teeth and can be stopped only at high cost for the world. They can be deterred from actually using any weapon they eventually acquire.

The bottom line is: in today's uncertain world, it is better for the superpower to make the promise of strictly abiding by international law, even if that means breaking it on rare occasions,⁹ than to leave all options on the table as a matter of policy. The former builds a credible reputation as a peace-loving nation. The latter fuels the cycle of violence – and buys little room for manoeuvre anyway.

Europeans are more reluctant to infringe international law about the use of force. However, they fully embraced NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1997, and they continue to acquiesce in American coercive diplomacy in the cases of Iran and North Korea, which contributes to the perception of NATO being an imperialist power. Europeans should increase pressure on their American ally to strictly adhere to international law. Distancing themselves from the American threat to use force in case of Iranian non-compliance with the nuclear deal would be a good place to start.

To be clear, the Russian and Chinese vetoes at the Security Council will not affect WSC's capacity to defend its members, which is its primary mission. International law allows states to deploy arms as they see fit for their individual or collective defense. WSC members would not have to wait for any approval of the UN Security Council to retaliate against foreign aggression. The Russian and Chinese vetoes will only prevent WSC and its members from committing aggression themselves, that is, shooting first. When rivals increase their military power, it is tempting to wage 'preventive wars' to keep them down. While in some cases it

might increase the security of the WSC in the short term, it inevitably fuels the cycle of violence in the long term, and it is not necessary as WSC preserves a comfortable military superiority. The 2003 war against Iraq illustrates the folly of the preventive war concept.

WSC will increase the security of its new members

There is little doubt that WSC will tremendously increase the security of its new members. They will overnight gain the protection of the most formidable military alliance in world history.

Those that have the most to gain are countries in the vicinity of Russia and China. But they also face risks. The precedents of Georgia and Ukraine, both attacked by Russia after their application to NATO, remind us of the sensitive situation in which countries at the periphery of Russia and China will find themselves during the accession process. A prudent strategy might be for them to opt for a close relationship with the WSC, working on all membership requirements to enable a quick accession if need be, but without actually becoming members in order not to provoke their powerful neighbour. They could do so while maintaining a cordial relationship with their neighbour. A smart approach for these countries is to let themselves be courted by both the WSC and Russia or China, and use the threat of actually joining the WSC to keep their powerful neighbour from bullying them. Ultimately, though, they should be free to choose for themselves. If they decide to join, the WSC should focus on an orderly accession process to ensure that it can actually defend them once admitted.

Further from Russia and China, many countries face few threats and might not feel the need to join the WSC. Nevertheless, an increasing number of countries might choose to join a peaceful and global WSC over time. As has been the case with accession to the European Union, WSC membership could both provide external resources and foster the domestic political will to strengthen institutions enabling countries to better cope with internal instability. Expanding the OECD in parallel with the WSC would further support such institutional strengthening. WSC membership would also increase its members' diplomatic influence.

More importantly, the primary factor of attraction to the WSC will be the mounting global catastrophic risks, which will bring security concerns to the fore in the decades to come. Climate change, migration, epidemics, financial crises – and a combination thereof – will increase the risk of war everywhere. Another attraction, one would hope, would be the prospect of joining in the construction of a more effective system of global governance.

WSC will increase the security of non-members

A first way in which the WSC will increase the security of non-members is by not attacking them. It is a sad reality that NATO members and particularly the United States have built a worrying track record of aggressions over the past decades. The threat of aggression, itself illegal, is official US policy (Obama 2015). Ending that would immediately decrease tensions between the United States and North Korea and Iran, as discussed above.

As a substitute to the use of force, the requirement that WSC members should accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice means that non-members would be able to sue any WSC member-states to settle any dispute. Having the option of suing powerful states would provide a strong incentive for weaker states to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, too (since acceptance is usually contingent upon acceptance by the other party of a case). That would significantly strengthen the current international legal

framework, as few countries currently accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (i.e., agree to implement its decisions; see Appendix D).

Given the current degree of distrust, those non-members that currently consider NATO as an adversary or rival, namely Russia and China, will not take the assurance of non-aggression at face value. They will be alarmed by the WSC's expansion and are likely to respond by boosting their own defence. An arms race is already ongoing. Our proposal may accelerate it in the short to medium term. But it may decelerate it in the longer term, as the WSC walks the talk of non-aggression. The antidote to distrust is credibility, and credibility is gained through consistency of action over the long term. The longer the WSC abides by its non-aggression pledge, the less China and Russia will perceive it as a threat. Eventually, as trust is built over time, the non-aggression norm and acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice would help to reduce tensions between the great powers and reduce the risk of any catastrophic nuclear conflict. This would hopefully allow accelerated nuclear disarmament, thus mitigating at least one of our global catastrophic risks. In the longer term, enough trust might be built between the superpowers to actually allow the complete elimination of these weapons, even before the ultimate vision of world federation is realized.

Moreover, the more members the WSC gains, the harder it will be for rivals to keep up with the ongoing arms race anyway. As long as the WSC retains military superiority and abides by the non-aggression norm, the arms race is unlikely to generate a direct military confrontation. The risk of a major war is actually greater in a steady-state scenario where China only competes against the United States and not an expanded WSC. China has been running a long-term marathon to catch up with the US military power. The closer she gets to parity or even superiority, the greater the risk that she takes her chance by invading Taiwan, for instance. The current status quo is not stable: relations between the West, Russia and China are not only poor, they are worsening by the day. Our proposal should be assessed in that context. Western leaders are divided about the right policy to deal with Russian provocations. Some of them are dovish (e.g. Italy), others hawkish (e.g. Britain), and yet others divided (e.g. Senate vs. President in the United States), with national elections regularly changing the mix. Hence Russia hears conflicting signals: Western doves manage to block new sanctions, which frustrates hawks who manage to maintain existing sanctions, which frustrates Russia. Our proposal sets a middle-of-the-road course that can instill some predictability and hence stability to the relations among great powers: the WSC will assert that countries are free to join defense alliance and will do what it takes to defend them, but will refrain from provocations of its own by strictly abiding by international law.

Some non-member states may be afflicted by civil war or war with their neighbours. The Community would enable members to pool resources and expertise in carrying out more effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, to prevent incipient civil wars and conflicts in failing states, or in reconstructing failed states after conflicts have occurred. An example of such an operation on a small scale was the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which succeeded in preventing an incipient civil war in that country. Acting strictly at the behest of the Security Council, the Community could play a role very like that originally envisaged for a standing security force under Article 47 of the UN Charter, in collaboration with other countries volunteering their resources. All states actually have the obligation to lend support to any security enforcement actions mandated by the Security Council under article 43 of the Charter.

Furthermore, the Community should also set up mechanisms to assist in the reconstruction of failed states after conflict, following the outstanding example of the Marshall Plan after World War II. This would give the Community a very positive role to play in healing the wounds created by armed conflict, something conspicuously absent after the recent

overthrow of regimes in Iraq and Libya. Such developments would be in full accord with the role of the new Peacebuilding Commission at the United Nations. For instance, the Community could set up rapid reaction units to carry out the role advocated for UNEPS, the proposed UN Emergency Peace Service. Resources for that purpose could come from synergies and economies of scale that members could realize in their defense budgets by pooling resources with other Community members.

One particularly harmful aspect of the Cold War was that the United States and the Soviet Union fought proxy wars by fuelling civil conflicts. They armed rebels in countries ruled by governments sympathetic to the other side. The WSC's commitment to respecting international law does not only mean renouncing direct military interventions in civil wars, it also precludes providing weapons or any other form of material assistance to violent opposition. American and Turkish support to Syrian rebels would not be allowed, for instance. The WSC should renounce such behaviour, lest it would feed a cycle of violence that would degenerate into a new cold war. However, it is always legal to support a government that requests assistance, even if the country is not a WSC member. So the WSC will be able to – but will not have to – provide assistance to a government facing an armed rebellion, but it will not be allowed to support rebels. By demonstrating its commitment to international law, the WSC will send a message to would-be rebels around the world that armed opposition is not the solution to civil conflicts. Academic studies have shown that in most cases armed opposition to oppression does not yield better results than non-violent opposition anyway (WBW 2018).

There are however cases where governments commit atrocities on people who have not taken arms, or retaliate disproportionately to armed opposition. That led NATO to intervene in Kosovo in 1999.¹⁰ A critique of our proposal is that it rules out humanitarian interventions that could end genocides and crimes against humanity. That is not correct, as humanitarian interventions could still be launched with the approval of the UN Security Council, as per the 2005 UN agreement on the responsibility to protect. NATO's bombing of Libya in 2011 demonstrates that Chinese and Russian suspicion toward military humanitarianism can be overcome. It also underscores that their goodwill should not be abused – they perceived that NATO overstepped its mandate – nor should humanitarianism be exploited in pursuit of national interests. In the current context, Russia and China would be likely to veto an operation similar to that of Libya. However, that is partly due to their reaction to Western unilateralism: when you feel pushed aside, you tend to dig in. Making it clear that the WSC will respect Russia and China as equal partners in the Security Council to resolve crises outside of the territories of WSC member-states will produce a healthier environment for collaboration and allow Russia and China to act more responsibly and less defensively.

Humanitarian military interventions are challenging, and ignoring a UN Security Council veto makes them even more so. For example, Westerners are appalled at the situation in Syria and some want to intervene with force despite both the Russian and Chinese vetoes. However, a first constraint is the Western public's own weariness with committing blood and treasure to such interventions. President Obama canceled planned air strikes against the Syrian government in 2013 and President Trump is now withdrawing troops fighting Islamic State for that reason. A second challenge is that state-building is hard, as the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate. If Russia and China gave *carte blanche* for WSC to intervene, it should do so only if it can muster public support to commit the necessary resources over the long run to put an end to the fighting and rebuild the country. But the task would be hopeless without a consensus at the Security Council. As Russia, as well as Iran in this case, support the other side, any WSC intervention would end up in a quagmire that would prolong the civil war until the Western public would grow tired of it. It is best to sit down with the parties involved and seek a diplomatic solution.

Finally, we reiterate that the establishment of WSC is envisaged as only the first stage in an evolutionary process, following the European model. The end-point would be a democratic world federation of universal scope, capable of making binding world laws in its defined sphere of responsibility, and ensuring that any dispute between member states can be settled peacefully. At that point, if not before, the nuclear weapon states would be able to finally discard their nuclear weapons, with their security assured by other means. This would finally satisfy the famous dream of Albert Einstein: *“In my opinion, the only salvation for civilisation and the human race lies in the creation of a world government, with security of nations founded upon law.”* (Nathan 1968)

Coping with Other Global Catastrophic Risks

While our working group has focused on security, we have always been driven by our long-term vision of a democratic world federation that would deal with all global catastrophic risks. The question then arises: how can a purely defence community diversify in other issue areas without “securitizing” them? One solution is to rely on another organization of democratic nations: the OECD. The OECD fosters coordination of its members’ economic, social and environmental policies and has facilitated over two hundred international agreements, mostly in technical areas (such as transborder transportation of chemicals, for example), some of which are binding on its members (OECD 2018a). We consider three institutional reforms at OECD that would give it new functions, allow it to deepen relationships among democracies and complement WSC by addressing global catastrophic risks related to economic, social and environmental policies. We envision the OECD and WSC as two agencies of the same community of democracies.

First, the OECD should revise its membership requirements and accession process, such that its membership continues to largely overlap with that of WSC. Most but not all NATO members are OECD members and vice versa, and all countries that are member of only one of them are good candidates for the other (see Appendix D for a list of countries and their membership in relevant international institutions). We want it to remain that way, such that the WSC and OECD continue to consist of roughly the same members, which would foster a common identity. However, the dual OECD/ WSC admission tracks would provide some flexibility for countries interested in either closer economic or security cooperation but not the other to deepen relations with other democracies without belonging to both institutions.

Like NATO, the OECD has a loose membership requirement of democracy (see Appendix B). It has a somewhat stronger membership requirement relating to free market institutions: new members are expected to adopt a dozen of international agreements about capital movement, taxation of international income, corruption, corporate governance, statistics, and internet governance (OECD 2017). Unlike NATO, the OECD has already started to grow out of the North Atlantic area (e.g. Chile, Korea) and embrace middle-income countries (e.g. Mexico). However, membership remains by invitation only, and the OECD is looking for a membership that balances “like-mindedness” with global influence and representativeness. Interestingly, countries like Costa Rica and Colombia are on the membership track,¹¹ while bigger countries like Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa are “partners”, meaning that they participate in much of the work without a vote and without the expectation that they will implement all the agreements.¹² These partner countries perceive some of the required economic standards, like the one on taxation, as favouring richer countries, which is a barrier for them to join as full members.

Our purpose is to build a strong community of democracies. Just as NATO developed within a web of multiple institutions with overlapping relationships (e.g. the OECD, European

Union, Council of Europe), it would be difficult for the WSC to expand globally as a purely defense alliance without a web of overlapping bonds. Our Working Group would therefore advocate for more flexibility on the part of the OECD to ensure that its Partner Countries become full members. That may entail some compromises on global economic policies. But that would contribute to a geopolitical realignment further discussed in the next section. An analogy is the development of democracy at the national level in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The upper class had to give in and enfranchise the middle class because the latter gained real economic power anyway. Later the working class was enfranchised as well to avoid revolution. Likewise, the spirit of our proposal is that, with clouds of global catastrophic risks gathering on the horizon, Western countries should refrain from circling the wagons around their privileges, but rather reach out to democratic middle-income and later low-income countries.

Second, the OECD should start convening regular summits of its members' heads of state or government in conjunction with WSC summits. Given that the international agreements negotiated by the OECD are usually technical in nature, OECD members' representatives currently only meet at ambassadorial and ministerial levels. The OECD summits that we propose would serve to coordinate economic, social and environmental policy at a high level.¹³ Since the OECD and WSC memberships would largely overlap, a single summit could include agendas of both organizations. Members of only one of the organization would either recuse themselves or observe the parts of the agenda relating to the other organization. The same group of leaders could thus develop tighter personal relationships and act as leaders of a unified community of democratic nations across all global public policy issues. The joint WSC and OECD summit could also serve as forum to coordinate their members' positions and votes in other intergovernmental organizations including the United Nations, for instance to revitalize the dysfunctional Human Rights Committee that is often captured by authoritarian governments.

Third, the OECD should channel funds to foster development in the less developed member states under the principle of 'solidarity' established by the European Union. This would promote a feeling of community among the member states, and provide a strong incentive for new states to join in (Yuncker 2014). This would be within the competence of the OECD, which started its life (then known as OEEC) as the implementation arm for the Marshall Plan and still retains expertise in development aid standards. The more developed member-states could pool some of their foreign aid for disbursement through the OECD to its least developed members or its candidate members to strengthen their institutional capacity. That would also enable faster accession of low-income countries to the OECD.

Our working group has not focused on the specific contributions that the OECD makes to address global catastrophic risks, but they are many. For instance, the OECD has expertise in agriculture, energy, transportation, and construction, all sectors critical to climate change. The OECD's web site lists a range of activities that the organization already undertakes to move economies to a low carbon intensity (OECD 2018b). Such work would continue with a broader membership and the OECD might facilitate North-South agreements that have so far eluded the United Nations. While one might retort that the OECD's work duplicates that of the United Nations, some degree of institutional competition stimulates innovation. The OECD has real advantages over ECOSOC, its counterpart at the United Nations. The OECD has a can-do, pragmatic culture fostering technical agreements. It fosters networks of national civil servants who are experts in their domains and are backed up by world-class analytical capacity in the OECD secretariat itself. This contrasts with ECOSOC that is understaffed, to which national governments typically send generalists from foreign ministries, and where there is a culture of political grandstanding and smallest-common-denominator political declarations. Finally, we envisage that the OECD would dispose of much larger funds under our new scheme.

Once again, we envisage the community of democracies consisting of the WSC and OECD as only the first stage in an evolutionary process leading towards a democratic world federation. At later stages via new treaties, the community should be given governance responsibility to make regulations and laws binding upon members in areas such as finance, the economy, and the environment, with the capacity to deal effectively with all our global problems.

Implementation Process

Implementation of this scheme would in principle require a new Treaty between the founding members. But who should these be?

The obvious starting point to create the WSC would be to reform NATO. NATO is the most powerful defense alliance in the world today. It already includes many of the institutional features we have proposed for WSC (see Appendix E). For 70 years, it has been very effective at its core mission: defending its members against potential attack. It has built a whole civilian and military infrastructure. It has honed standard operating procedures to deliver security. For those reasons, its members are unlikely to leave it in order to join a brand new, untested alliance. And without the current NATO members, the WSC would be too puny militarily to become an effective dissuasive force.

But we get it: NATO has an image problem with some people. Like corporations in the same situation, it could use some rebranding and a marketing campaign, starting with changing its name. Such rebranding would not be window-dressing, as the WSC would be different from NATO precisely in the two areas that currently give NATO a bad name: first, it would respect international law, and second, it would open itself to non-Western countries.

To continue the corporate analogy, companies expand themselves in two ways: mergers, and acquisitions. The expansion strategy of the OECD that we have just discussed is one of acquisitions. When Costa Rica and Colombia join the OECD, the OECD will become somewhat more diverse, but its current identity of an exclusive rich country club will not be shaken. By contrast, if the OECD were to admit its Partner Countries as we advocated in the previous section, that would be a merger: with the membership of Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa, the identity and perception of the OECD would fundamentally change. Likewise with NATO. If it opened membership to any democracies in the world and admitted, say, Tunisia, that would be an acquisition. We support that route as one option. We equally support the merger option: in one big bang, the North Atlantic Treaty could be merged with the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) Treaty as well as the bilateral defense treaties that bind the United States and Japan and South Korea. It could also be merged with the Rio Treaty, a defense alliance of the United States and seventeen Latin American countries (see Appendix D for the list of countries).¹⁴ Such a merger would cure NATO's image as a Western imperialist club. But to get there, NATO would probably need to make some compromises, just as the OECD would. Indeed, six countries have left the Rio Treaty in protest against the United States' foreign policy and in particular its track record of aggression.¹⁵ That underscores the importance of our proposal that WSC should strictly respect international law. The best route to creating WSC is combining the two options: starting with some acquisitions to build credibility that NATO intends to change, followed by a merger to establish the change.

Having both the OECD and the WSC going through such an acquisition spree followed by a true merger would rebalance geopolitics in a way that could be transformative to global governance, which in turn could significantly shift out the boundaries of what is considered

as politically feasible to cope with all global catastrophic risks. Global governance is currently in a tail spin as geopolitical relations deteriorate. The current trend is set to continue with, on the one hand, Western countries circling the wagons around their privileges and, on the other hand, Russia and China claiming back their status of global power and, in between, the large middle-income democracies watching the fight from the sidelines. Our political project is for Western countries to reach out to the middle-income democracies, which will require the former to model good behavior and make compromises, to increase trust and collaboration in order to improve global governance in all domains. As argued in the section on political violence, relations with Russia and China are likely to remain tense in the process, but stabilize instead of worsening as they do now.

The implementation challenge of our proposal is to pace the expansion. If the WSC expanded too quickly, even opening itself to Russia and China early on, it would basically become like the United Nations, and not any more effective than the United Nations. We must ensure that new members are truly committed to democracy, human rights and international law and accept the institutional features outlined in our proposal to ensure accountability. If the expansion is too slow, it may not improve global governance fast enough to cope with urgent global catastrophic risks and could be overwhelmed with actual catastrophes. It is impossible to say how much time the expansion will take, but certainly several decades. Some countries will need more time to meet the membership requirements than others; some countries will have more interest in joining than others. The second column of the table in Appendix D shows the countries that would easily meet any human rights membership requirements. The other columns show the level of engagement in various existing international institutions. The more columns a country fits, the more likely it is to be an early WSC member. Appendix F analyses the national interests of countries and regions to join the WSC.

The geographic expansion of NATO beyond the North Atlantic area to give birth to WSC constitutes the core of our proposal. It would require an amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty, to be agreed unanimously by all member-states and ratified by their parliaments. Although unanimity is a high bar, a strong political commitment of the most powerful countries (i.e. the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) should probably suffice. If they are determined, smaller countries would have no choice but to go along or leave NATO. We discuss how the leaders of the biggest countries could reach such a decision in the next section, and in Appendix F.

A stricter respect of international law regarding the use of force and acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by all WSC members is another core part of our proposal. In a legal sense no new approval is necessary here, since this is a provision of the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty already.¹⁶ It is a matter of changing policy to comply with the law.

All the other elements of our proposal deal with the internal structure and functioning of the Community itself. If NATO is the starting point for the WSC, Appendix E outlines what changes NATO needs to make to become the WSC we envision. These changes could possibly be adopted by WSC's Council, composed of the representatives of all members' governments, without need for ratification by the US Senate and other parliaments. The North Atlantic Treaty has indeed the great advantage of being very brief, and hence very flexible. The Treaty does not even specify that the Council's decisions must be made by consensus (except for geographic expansion). That is merely a convention. A qualified majority of members could thus decide that decisions would henceforth be made by qualified majority, although that could obviously create political tensions. Still, as mentioned earlier, if the handful of biggest countries were determined to make such a change, smaller countries would be faced with the options of agreeing or leaving, and they would probably agree given

the advantages that the WSC offers. In fact, such a change would give them a bigger voice in the decisions of the Community.

The other elements of our proposal – the membership requirements, the voting rights, the Court, the development funds – are not absolutely essential to the scheme in the short and medium term. They are aimed at making the Community more effective and efficient in its decision-making and operations, and laying the foundations for our ultimate vision of a democratic world federation. If necessary, they could await later stages as well, depending on political opportunity. A general rule of thumb, however, is that it is better to adopt these reforms as soon as possible, as they will become increasingly necessary for WSC to function properly as the number of WSC members rises, as explained in the Political violence section.

In summary, our working group advocates all the reforms outlined in the Proposal section. But we realize that they are unlikely to be adopted at once as a package. We would support adoption of any combination thereof or any one individually, following political opportunity.

Advocacy Strategy

What can we do as global citizens to help implement this scheme? The world federalist movement (WFM-IGP) has implemented a successful strategy, forming large coalitions of NGOs in support, first of all, of an International Criminal Court, and secondly, of the UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect. Both of these campaigns achieved success in a relatively short time. Correspondingly, we are in the process of setting up a Coalition for a World Security Community of democratic nations, which is still in its infancy (Coalition 2018). But we also have a vision for a more ambitious advocacy strategy.

Firstly, we will look for support for our proposal from other civil society organizations and individuals. Our Coalition's website already lists a few organizational supporters (Coalition 2018). We will look in the near future for further support and advice on our proposal from other organizations in the Atlanticist movement, such as the Atlantic Council and the Streit Council, and in the world federalist movement around the world, such as the Union of European Federalists and the Spinelli Group.

Our proposal has several components and while we will continue to recruit supporters for the whole package, we will also be flexible and form different alliances for different issues. In particular, the first core element of our proposal is NATO's transformation into a WSC through geographic expansion beyond the North Atlantic area. That component is attractive to foreign policy experts, military officials, and politicians mainly on the right of the political spectrum as evidenced by similar proposals advanced in the past by former French Prime Minister Balladur, former Spanish Prime Minister Aznar, former Danish Prime Minister and former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, the late US Senator McCain, and former US Ambassador to NATO Daalder (Balladur 2007, Aznar 2006, Rasmussen 2016, McCain 2007, Daalder and Lindsay 2007; see also Appendix F). The right approach to advance that idea is to foster a debate among think tanks and within political parties, and eventually recruit active political leaders (instead of former ones) to champion it. Currently people like President Macron or Prime Minister Trudeau are the kind of leaders who might be interested in bold new visions for a peaceful and open world. Tomorrow the next British Prime Minister is likely to be interested in a bold vision involving NATO in order to maintain Britain's relevance in a post-Brexit world. In Appendix F, we review the national interests of major countries and regions in regard to our proposal. We will use and refine that analysis to advocate for our proposal in foreign policy circles throughout the world.

The second core element of our proposal is that WSC members should abide by international law, especially regarding the use of force, and accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. That component is attractive to a different set of actors, generally more to the left of the political spectrum, including pacifist organizations, human rights groups, humanitarian NGOs, faith-based groups, feminist organizations, and grassroots solidarity groups. The right approach to advance that idea is advocacy campaigns engaging the general public driven by a broad-based coalition of NGOs.

Our Coalition is thus a rare actor that is equally comfortable in both the national security community and the global governance community, with both foreign policy experts and grassroots activists. It is because we straddle the political spectrum that we are able to propose a credible plan for comprehensive and sustainable international peace, something that neither foreign policy think tanks nor NGOs have done so far. This argument is developed in two referenced blogs (Jacobs 2014, Jacobs 2015), which provide insights not only about our own proposal, but also about the whole field that GCF is considering funding.

We have a bold ambition to fill a void and become a new kind of peace organization. The international development movement has Oxfam, the human rights movement Amnesty International, and the environmental movement Greenpeace. But there is no equivalent large campaigning NGO in the peace movement. The peace movement can muster millions of demonstrators when national troops are in harm's way. But there is little sustained engagement of the public on peace and security issues when troops are brought back home. Besides the World Federalist Movement itself, whose mission is broader than peace but includes it, there is no private nonprofit advocacy organization that is (i) dedicated to peace, (ii) global, (iii) campaigning (i.e. mobilizing the general public), (iv) professional (i.e. paid staff), and (v) mainstream (i.e. not advocating for unilateral disarmament). We have the vision for a new organization ticking all these boxes. It would be the first organization following a clear roadmap to world peace: creating a community of nations committed to international law and human rights, which would defend each other without threatening those on the outside, and which would incrementally expand to the whole world by attraction, not coercion.

To achieve that ambition, we must mobilize the general public. Although we have not yet done any market research, we believe that our message could appeal to a couple of demographic profiles in particular. One is the kind of people who join the Rotary Club. In their late 50s or 60s, their parents were kids during World War II and they were kids during the Vietnam War; they are relatively wealthy and philanthropists; they are globally-minded and politically middle-of-the-road; and – for Westerners – they are worried that their grandchildren will not have as good a life as theirs. We want to tap into that sentiment and provide them some hope. Another potential demographic target group is refugees and diasporas. If you live in a refugee camp in South Sudan, the United Nations is basically your local government that runs the schools and collects the trash; you live at the sharp end of geopolitical decisions and have probably lost relatives to war; and you have a lot of time on your hands. These two groups could be prime targets for recruitment of peace activists who would work alongside broader coalitions as explained above to achieve the different components of our proposal.

Conclusion

To prevent the global catastrophic risks of political violence, all states would ideally respect the UN Charter's prohibition of aggression and accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the

International Court of Justice to settle disputes. As citizens of Australia, the United States and Europe, we will endeavour to ensure that our own governments commit to that path of peaceful co-existence. We will reach out to citizens of Brazil, India, South Africa and other democracies to join us in that effort. Ideally we would also engage citizens through advocacy campaigns in China, Russia or North Korea, but governments there would not allow us to do so. As mutual suspicion among great powers lingers, democracies should unite and protect each other while modelling peaceful behaviour.

Our proposal for a World Security Community would produce a powerful new global security community, which acting in tandem with the United Nations would be a strong force for peace and freedom in the world. It would provide a strong guarantee of security to all its members. New members, meeting suitable criteria of democracy and peaceful relations with their neighbours, would be attracted by the protection it would offer in an increasingly turbulent world. The membership could soon include the majority of the world's nations, as more countries become democratic. Eventually, one may hope that membership in the Community would become universal. Meanwhile, the Community could pool its members' resources and assist the United Nations in its peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.

With the addition of a Court, the adoption of qualified majority voting, and an association with the OECD, the Community would emulate the European model. It would provide a convenient forum for discussion and the making of common policy on matters beyond the security sphere, including trade, finance and the environment. In time to come, one can envisage the Community evolving into a full-blown democratic and federal world government. Such a global democracy would help enormously in confronting all the global catastrophic risks which are facing us.

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Appendix A: Background on NATO Reform and League of Democracies

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO lost its original role as bulwark of Western Europe against a possible Soviet attack. Since then it has been slowly developing a new role, remaining as an umbrella organization for the defence of the Atlantic democracies, but now also acting as their “out of area” security and peacekeeping arm, first in Bosnia, then in Afghanistan and Libya. Members of the EU are still debating whether they should continue to rely on NATO for their collective defence, or establish their own European armed forces.

A number of Eastern European countries have recently joined NATO, which now has 29 members. This puts the old consensus model of decision-making under great strain. At his parting session with the Atlantic Council in 2007, General James Jones, the outgoing Supreme Allied Commander Europe, called for a stronger political structure for NATO (Jones 2007): “Sooner or later, NATO will have to address whether you want 350 committees all acting on the rule of consensus,” he said. “What’s the logic of one or two countries being able to block action by the remaining 24 members? Why not have a system where they can just opt out?”

Later, a group of five very distinguished military officials put forward a ‘Grand Strategy’ for renewing NATO, echoing General Jones’ call (Naumann 2007). They were all former chiefs of staff in their respective countries (the US, Britain, France, Germany and Holland), headed by General John Shalikashvili of the US. Among many other suggestions, they suggested a shift in NATO decision-making from consensus to majority voting, and the abolition of national caveats in operational matters.

Along with new members, many countries further afield have become NATO “Partners”. It is therefore not a huge step to envision expanding NATO membership to democracies outside the traditional boundaries of Europe and North America. Former Spanish Prime Minister Aznar advocated just such an expansion (Aznar 2006). Emphasizing the new threat of terrorism, he argued that NATO should develop a new dimension of homeland security to counter it, including integration of intelligence information and security services across all the democracies. He thus concluded that stable democracies such as Japan and Australia should be invited to join. This call was echoed on the other side of the Atlantic by Senator John McCain during his 2007 run for the US presidency, who advocated a League of Democracies (McCain 2007). Reinforcing this theme, the former Danish Prime Minister and Secretary-General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has recently published a book offering a bold plan for an Alliance for Democracy, a “strengthened American and European alliance, joined by like-minded liberal democracies such as Japan and Australia, to create a military, political, and economic bulwark against the forces of tyranny” (Rasmussen 2016).

Many of these changes have also been called for by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (Resolution 337). Academics have further debated the concept of a League or Concert of Democracies (Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006; Daalder and Lindsay 2007).

In recent years, NATO has been recalled towards its original purpose by the revanchist behaviour of Russia under President Putin. Russia was alarmed and suspicious when its former Soviet satellites in the Baltic states and Eastern Europe elected to join NATO after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia’s recent annexation of the Crimea, and destabilisation of the eastern Ukraine, has in turn alarmed the Baltic states and the Eastern Europeans, fearing that they may be the next Russian targets. They have called for more concrete support from NATO as insurance against such a possibility, and indeed NATO has responded to these requests. At the Warsaw summit in 2016, NATO members agreed on steps to “reinforce our collective defence, enhance our capabilities and strengthen our

resilience” (NATO 2016). But disagreements have emerged about the stance NATO should adopt toward Russia, with some decision-makers preferring confronting Russia over her aggressive behaviour, at the risk of provoking her, while others prefer appeasing Russia, at the risk of emboldening her. This ongoing debate underscores the tension inherent to NATO’s expansion.

In the Pacific, China’s newly assertive behaviour in fortifying islets in the South China Sea, in defiance of a judgement by the International Court of Justice, has caused alarm among democracies in the region. There has been much discussion over how to counter rising Chinese influence in the region, and what measures of collective security might contribute to that end [Thomas 2018]. Our proposal would answer that perceived need.

Appendix B. Human Rights Membership Requirements

Several intergovernmental organizations require their members to abide by democracy or human rights standards. We can distinguish different models.

NATO and OECD: Both of these organizations claim that they are clubs of democracies. However, neither of them has a rigorous definition of what democracy is or a systematic process to ensure that they only admit democracies and that their members remain democracies. At the end of the day, admission of new members is by invitation only and comes down to a political judgment of “like-mindedness”. Hence NATO admitted several countries that were dictatorships at the time (e.g. Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey) on the ground that they were market economies aligned to the West against communism. Turkey’s human rights record remains problematic to this day.

This model is not adequate for the WSC for a couple of reasons. First, it is arbitrary and hence can be viewed as unfair by left-out countries and can generate animosity. Second, it lacks an enforcement mechanism such that nothing prevents members relapsing into authoritarianism while remaining members.

OSCE: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was created during the Cold War to promote dialogue and reduce tensions across the Iron Curtain. It includes all European countries. One of its functions is to promote human rights. It has developed expertise in election monitoring. It sends monitoring teams in advance of all national elections in its member states to make an in-depth assessment of whether elections are “free and fair”. The assessment covers everything from the independence of the electoral commission to the balance of media coverage during the electoral campaign. The teams produce reports with non-binding recommendations. The reports’ executive summaries do attempt to provide an overall qualitative judgment. For instance, Turkey’s latest elections “offered voters a genuine choice despite the lack of conditions for contestants to compete on an equal basis”. By contrast, Belarus’ elections “were efficiently organized, but, despite some first steps by the authorities, a number of long-standing systemic shortcomings remain”. At the other end of the spectrum, in Belgium “all [OSCE] interlocutors expressed full confidence in the election administration and their ability to organize elections impartially and professionally, noting that the diverse political and media landscape enhances transparency and accountability”. Interestingly, however, OSCE did produce recommendations for Belgium as well. Even the strongest democracies can improve.

This model is not adequate for WSC because of this last observation: democracy is not a black and white concept. There is a continuum of practices that make each country more or

less democratic. While OSCE (like the private organization Freedom House) does manage to make overall assessment of “free and fair” elections, it is a qualitative and somewhat subjective assessment because it is impossible to objectively draw a clear line between democracies and dictatorships. There are too many variables to take into account (e.g., law on political parties, voters’ registration process, integrity of vote counting). OSCE’s reports are not binding. If WSC were to adopt this methodology to make the high-stake binding decisions of admitting or expelling some members, the qualitative assessments made by its civil servants would become very controversial and there would be a lot of pressure to politicize them.

Council of Europe: The Council of Europe developed the European Convention on Human Rights, an international treaty that defines a series of specific human rights (including the rights of expression, association, free elections, fair trial etc.) and establishes the European Court of Human Rights. Almost all European countries adhere to the Convention. The Convention allows individual citizens to bring cases before the Court, in many cases against their own government, but only after having exhausted appeals in national courts. If the Court finds that a human rights violation has taken place, it can order reparations, and such an order is legally binding on the member state. States usually comply with the Court’s decisions. However, there are decisions that remain unimplemented, and their number has risen steeply in the past few years in some countries (Muižnieks, 2016). The Committee of Ministers of the members of the Council of Europe monitors unimplemented cases. At a majority of two thirds, it can “consider measures to be taken”. It has never taken any measures so far, but it invoked the procedure for the first time against Azerbaijan last year; the decision is pending (Glas 2017). The only two possible measures one could envisage are to suspend Azerbaijan’s voting rights at the Council of Europe, or expel her from that organization altogether. Other members are reluctant to do that because it is precisely countries like Azerbaijan that most need this international institution. Indeed, Azerbaijan’s President has hinted at withdrawing the country from the Council of Europe, demonstrating that expulsion would not be a blow to him. The Council of Europe is basically a gentleman’s club that relies on its members’ goodwill and commitment to human rights to implement its decisions.

The Council of Europe provides a great model for WSC. Unlike the OSCE that relies on the qualitative judgment of its civil servants, this model pushes the judgment call back to candidate members: while the WSC founding members would collectively define the list of human rights, it would be up to candidate members to decide whether they are ready to adopt them or not. Another strength of this model is its built-in enforcement mechanism: individual citizens can take their own government to court. That depoliticizes the enforcement process. In the case of the Council of Europe, enforcement is imperfect because it ultimately still relies on a political vote of ministers at a two-thirds majority, and then the sanctions is paltry, as governments violating human rights merely lose no more than prestige if their country is expelled. WSC could resolve both of these problems. The Court itself could be given the prerogative to monitor implementation of its rulings and find governments in contempt. And expulsion from WSC would be much more damaging to a government than expulsion from the Council of Europe, given all the benefits that WSC would provide. Expulsion from the organization should still be a political decision at qualified majority. But if an independent court found a government in contempt of its obligations, that would strengthen the hand of political leaders to expel the country, which would itself dissuade the country from violating the rules in the first place. The adoption of this model by the WSC could constitute the biggest advance in the international human rights regime since the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights itself in 1950.

This model nevertheless raises a couple of challenges. First, founding members must agree on the list and definitions of human rights. That should not be too difficult among countries

rated as “free” by Freedom House, which account for 87 out of 193 states in the world. Some rights are nevertheless controversial, like the prohibition of the death penalty in the European Convention on Human Rights. The WSC’s founding members would be well-advised to leave out such controversial rights from the membership requirements. A second and more difficult challenge is the idolatry of sovereignty and hence ideological opposition to supranational courts that prevails in much of the world, and even in Europe (Muižnieks, 2016). Even though democracies have little to fear from an international human rights court, they don’t like to submit themselves to such authority. The International Criminal Court (the only international court outside of Europe where citizens can sue governments) shows that this ideological opposition can be overcome, but it is nevertheless a big challenge, including for the United States. This model may not be adopted by WSC immediately, but it is certainly one that world federalists should advocate.

European Union: Candidate members are required to translate a corpus of EU law known as the *acquis communautaire* into their national law. It includes legislation to ensure the independence, impartiality and effectiveness of the judiciary, anti-corruption measures, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union that outlines the rights of EU citizens toward the EU institutions and the EU laws implemented by member states. All these laws are meant to ensure that candidate countries have “achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union” (the so-called “Copenhagen criteria”). Once admitted, members that violate these laws can be sued at the European Court of Justice. In a recent and unprecedented ruling, the Court ordered Poland to reverse some judicial reforms it had adopted on the ground that they threatened the independence of the judiciary and hence the integrity of EU law (Euractiv, 2018). Had Poland not complied, the only possible sanction would have been depriving the country of its voting rights in the European Union, which would have required a unanimous vote of the other members. That might have been problematic because the Hungarian government, itself in the cross-hairs with European institutions, had hinted at solidarity with Poland. There is no option of expulsion from the European Union, which means that in theory a renegade government could do great damage by taking advantage of the Single Market while not meeting its obligations.

The European Union provides another great model for WSC. It is more demanding than the Council of Europe model because it requires members to adopt human rights standards in their national legislation at a more granular level than the European Convention of Human Rights. It otherwise has the same advantages and challenges as the Council of Europe model. Learning from the EU experience with Poland and Hungary, it would be wise for the WSC to give its Council the right to expel members on a qualified majority vote, a sanction that would likely dissuade members from breaking the rules in the first place.

This model suggests an alternative that might offer a solution to the challenge of sovereignty. AS in the European Union, candidate WSC members might be required to integrate a specific list of human rights into their national legislations. That would be compatible with sovereignty as it would be the free choice of national parliaments (i.e. they would be free not to adopt these standards and not join the WSC). These human rights standards could be very specific about the independence, impartiality, and effectiveness of the judiciary in order to ensure that national courts would enforce them adequately. Unlike both the European Union and the Council of Europe, but like the International Court of Justice, WSC members could be allowed to refuse the binding jurisdiction of the Court of the WSC in order to affirm their national sovereignty. This system would ensure that all WSC members at least start with a strong democracy and human rights record. But there would be no judicial recourse against backsliding as in the Polish case. The sanctions of suspension

of voting rights and expulsion could still be adopted as well, but they would become a pure political decision by the Council, not legitimized by the Court.

African Union and Organization of American States: One of the purposes of the African Union is to promote human rights through the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which has been ratified by almost all African countries. The Charter defines a list of human rights, including civil and political but also social and economic rights, and even collective rights like the right to development and to self-determination, as well as some individual responsibilities. It invites member states to translate those rights into national legislation. However, doing that is not a requirement for membership in the African Union, and the Charter has no enforcement mechanism at all, except that a Commission elected by member-states is tasked with promoting human rights with non-binding recommendations and monitoring members' progress in the realization of these rights. The African Union nevertheless has one enforcement mechanism relevant to democracy: governments that came to power through unconstitutional means (e.g. a coup) are suspended from AU activities.

The Organization of American States, of which almost all states on the American continent are members, follows the same model, with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights monitoring progress on the American Convention on Human rights. The Organization of American States also suspends unelected governments. Unlike the African Commission, however, the Inter-American Commission can receive complaints from individual citizens, investigate them, and make recommendations to the relevant state. There is also an Inter-American Court of Human Rights, but like the International Court of Justice, only states can bring cases to it, and members are free to refuse its binding jurisdiction.

(There are no equivalent to the Organization of American States or the African Union in Asia, and there is no set of Asian human rights standards.)

This model is not adequate for WSC due to its lack of an adequate enforcement mechanism.

Appendix C. Qualified Majority Voting Schemes

If the Community did adopt a qualified majority voting system for decision-making, how should it work? The theoretical answer to this question is well-known, and was first discussed by Lionel Penrose (Penrose 1946) in 1946. The European Union has dealt with the problem at a practical level in the Council of Ministers, and while the Penrose scheme was never formally adopted, the Union has arrived at a very similar result on purely pragmatic grounds, as illustrated in Figure 1.

The basic problem runs as follows: supposing an international council consists of representatives from many nations of very different sizes or populations, how should one allot relative voting weights to each representative? The simplest and most natural scheme would seem to allot a voting weight W proportional to the population P of the country he or she represents. But this turns out not to be the ideal scheme. Under that formula, the larger countries always dominate the voting. The smaller countries can vote how they please, they will never affect the outcome. Their "voting power" is zero, in the technical jargon.

Penrose showed that the 'correct' weighting system was to take the weight W proportional to the *square root* of the population P (see Figure 1). He considered each vote as analogous to the result of a scientific measurement, repeated many times. If the errors in the measurements are purely random, one can show that averaging over N measurements

produces a more accurate answer, where the expected error in the average decreases like one over the square root of N . A similar thing happens in opinion polls, where the expected error in the poll decreases like one over the square root of the number of people surveyed (e.g. a poll of 1000 people gives an expected error of about one over square root one thousand, or about 3%). Applying this to the voting system, in the absence of any *a priori* information, one expects the 'error' in each country's vote to go like one over square root P , and therefore it should be given a relative weighting proportional to square root P .

This system was proposed for use in the Council of Ministers of the European Union by Poland and Sweden, but never formally adopted. Nevertheless, on purely pragmatic grounds the Europeans have arrived at a weighting system which is remarkably similar to the Penrose model. It gives the smaller countries a bigger vote than one might naively think they are entitled to. This is illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Number of votes W allotted to each member state in the European Council of Ministers as a function of population P (in millions), according to the Treaty of Nice. Germany is the largest state with 82 million, Malta the smallest with 410,000. The ideal Penrose formula is shown as a dashed line (W proportional to square root of P).

A possible alternative would follow the principle "he who pays the piper calls the tune". It would consist in adopting a relative weighting formula where the yardstick is not population P , but the size of each nation's financial contribution to the organization C , or in other words take W proportional to square root C . This does not have the same 'mathematical' justification as the Penrose formula, but it means the United States would continue to have the biggest say, although not a dominant say, within the community. This is only a fair reflection of its power and influence in the world, and would continue to hold true even if

India, say, were admitted as a member of the Community. This alternative is less democratic, but politically more feasible. A third option is combining population and financial contributions, or revisiting the formula over time.

Provisions for Opting Out

It has been suggested (Jones 2007, Naumann 2007) that when the old system of making decisions by consensus is replaced by a qualified majority voting system, member nations should be given the right to opt out of any program or operation that they don't agree with. If a new intervention was being discussed by WSC, for instance, which attracted a majority vote in favour but was strongly opposed by one particular member nation, then that member would have the right to opt out of that particular operation. This would mean that it would not have to contribute funds, personnel or materiel to that particular operation, and conversely, would have no say or voting rights in further discussions of that operation at any level.

This would mean that a single country would no longer be able to *veto* a decision by the Community, but it would not be forced to take part in a Community operation if it was strongly opposed to it. Member nations would be less fearful of losing sovereignty to the new Community, and thus be more inclined to approve the new scheme. On the other hand, one nation opting out of a program would no doubt cause all sorts of administrative difficulties, and should not be made too easy. One possibility is that before the opt-out takes effect, the nation's parliament should be required to approve it by a majority vote. That should ensure that an opt-out would be a relatively rare occurrence.

Note however that all UN members are obliged to carry out decisions of the Security Council under Article 25 of the Charter. If the WSC submitted itself to the authority of the Security Council, that would make any opt-out provisions redundant and unnecessary.

Appendix D: Memberships of Various International Institutions

For all UN member states, the table below indicates their 2018 Freedom House score (a measure of democracy and human rights from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 100), whether they are member of NATO, OECD, a defense alliance other than NATO, whether they accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and whether they are party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

UN members	Freedom House score (2018)		NATO	OECD	Other defense alliance	ICJ	ICC
Afghanistan	26	Not free					Yes
Albania	68	Partly free	member				Yes
Algeria	35	Not free					
Andorra	96	Free					Yes
Angola	26	Not free					
Antigua & Barbuda	83	Free					Yes
Argentina	83	Free			Rio		Yes
Armenia	45	Partly free					
Australia	98	Free		member	ANZUS	Yes	Yes
Austria	94	Free		member		Yes	Yes

Azerbaijan	12	Not free					
Bahamas, The	91	Free			Rio		
Bahrain	12	Not free					
Bangladesh	45	Partly free					Yes
Barbados	96	Free				Yes	Yes
Belarus	21	Not free					
Belgium	95	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Belize	86	Free					Yes
Benin	82	Free					Yes
Bhutan	55	Partly free					
Bolivia	67	Partly free			former Rio		Yes
Bosnia & Herzegovina	55	Partly free					Yes
Botswana	72	Free				Yes	Yes
Brazil	78	Free		partner	Rio		Yes
Brunei	28	Not free					
Bulgaria	80	Free	member			Yes	Yes
Burkina Faso	60	Partly free					Yes
Burundi	18	Not free					Yes
Cambodia	30	Not free				Yes	Yes
Cameroon	22	Not free				Yes	
Canada	99	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Cape Verde	90	Free					Yes
Central African Rep.	9	Not free					Yes
Chad	18	Not free					Yes
Chile	94	Free		member	Rio		Yes
China	14	Not free		partner			
Colombia	65	Partly free		candidate	Rio		Yes
Comoros	55	Partly free					Yes
Congo, Dem. Rep. Of (Kinshasa)	17	Not free				Yes	Yes
Congo, Repub. of (Brazzaville)	21	Not free					Yes
Costa Rica	91	Free		candidate	Rio	Yes	Yes
Cote d'Ivoire	51	Partly free				Yes	
Croatia	86	Free	member				Yes
Cuba	14	Not free			former Rio		
Cyprus	94	Free				Yes	
Czech Republic	93	Free	member	member			Yes
Denmark	97	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Djibouti	26	Not free				Yes	Yes
Dominica	93	Free				Yes	Yes
Dominican Republic	67	Partly free			Rio	Yes	Yes
Ecuador	60	Partly free			former Rio		Yes
Egypt	26	Not free				Yes	

El Salvador	70	Free			Rio		
Equatorial Guinea	7	Not free				Yes	
Eritrea	3	Not free					
Estonia	94	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Ethiopia	12	Not free					
Fiji	59	Partly free					Yes
Finland	100	Free		member		Yes	Yes
France	90	Free	member	member			Yes
FYR Macedonia	58	Partly free	candidate				Yes
Gabon	23	Not free					Yes
Gambia, The	41	Partly free				Yes	Yes
Georgia	64	Partly free				Yes	Yes
Germany	94	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Ghana	83	Free					Yes
Greece	85	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Grenada	88	Free					Yes
Guatemala	56	Partly free			Rio		Yes
Guinea	41	Partly free				Yes	Yes
Guinea-Bissau	41	Partly free				Yes	
Guyana	74	Free					
Haiti	41	Partly free			Rio	Yes	
Honduras	46	Partly free			Rio	Yes	Yes
Hungary	72	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Iceland	95	Free	member	member			Yes
India	77	Free		partner		Yes	
Indonesia	64	Partly free		partner			
Iran	18	Not free					
Iraq	31	Not free					
Ireland	96	Free		member		Yes	Yes
Israel	79	Free		member			
Italy	89	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Jamaica	77	Free					
Japan	96	Free		member	bilateral US	Yes	Yes
Jordan	37	Partly free					Yes
Kazakhstan	22	Not free					
Kenya	48	Partly free				Yes	Yes
Kiribati	93	Free					
Korea, North	3	Not free					Yes
Korea, South	84	Free		member	bilateral US		Yes
Kuwait	36	Partly free					
Kyrgyzstan	37	Partly free					
Laos	12	Not free					
Latvia	87	Free	member	member			Yes
Lebanon	43	Partly free					

Lesotho	64	Partly free				Yes	Yes
Liberia	62	Partly free				Yes	Yes
Libya	9	Not free					
Liechtenstein	90	Free				Yes	Yes
Lithuania	91	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Luxembourg	98	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Madagascar	56	Partly free				Yes	Yes
Malawi	63	Partly free				Yes	Yes
Malaysia	45	Partly free					
Maldives	35	Partly free					Yes
Mali	44	Partly free					Yes
Malta	92	Free				Yes	Yes
Marshall Islands	92	Free				Yes	Yes
Mauritania	30	Not free					
Mauritius	89	Free				Yes	Yes
Mexico	62	Partly free		member	former Rio	Yes	Yes
Micronesia, Fed. St.	93	Free					
Moldova	61	Partly free					Yes
Monaco	82	Free					
Mongolia	85	Free					Yes
Montenegro	67	Partly free	member				Yes
Morocco	39	Partly free					
Mozambique	52	Partly free					
Myanmar	31	Partly free					
Namibia	77	Free					Yes
Nauru	81	Free					Yes
Nepal	55	Partly free					
Netherlands	99	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
New Zealand	98	Free		member	ANZUS	Yes	Yes
Nicaragua	44	Partly free			former Rio	Yes	
Niger	49	Partly free					Yes
Nigeria	50	Partly free				Yes	
Norway	100	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Oman	23	Not free					
Pakistan	43	Partly free				Yes	
Palau	92	Free					
Panama	83	Free			Rio	Yes	Yes
Papua New Guinea	63	Partly free					
Paraguay	64	Partly free			Rio	Yes	
Peru	73	Free			Rio	Yes	Yes
Philippines	62	Partly free			bilateral US	Yes	Yes
Poland	85	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Portugal	97	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes

Qatar	24	Not free					
Romania	84	Free	member			Yes	Yes
Russia	20	Not free		candidate - on hold			
Rwanda	23	Not free					
Saint Kitts & Nevis	89	Free					Yes
Saint Lucia	91	Free					Yes
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	90	Free					Yes
Samoa	80	Free					Yes
San Marino	97	Free					Yes
Sao Tome & Principe	82	Free					
Saudi Arabia	7	Not free					
Senegal	75	Free				Yes	Yes
Serbia	73	Free					Yes
Seychelles	71	Partly free					Yes
Sierra Leone	66	Partly free					Yes
Singapore	52	Partly free					
Slovakia	89	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Slovenia	93	Free	member	member		Yes	
Solomon Islands	72	Free					
Somalia	7	Not free					
South Africa	78	Free		partner			Yes
South Sudan	2	Not free					
Spain	94	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
Sri Lanka	55	Partly free					
Sudan	8	Not free				Yes	
Suriname	78	Free				Yes	Yes
Swaziland	16	Not free				Yes	
Sweden	100	Free		member		Yes	Yes
Switzerland	96	Free		member		Yes	Yes
Syria	-1	Not free					
Tajikistan	11	Not free					Yes
Tanzania	52	Partly free					Yes
Thailand	31	Not free					
Timor-Leste	69	Free				Yes	Yes
Togo	47	Partly free				Yes	
Tonga	75	Free					
Trinidad & Tobago	81	Free			Rio		Yes
Tunisia	70	Free					Yes
Turkey	32	Not free	member	member			
Turkmenistan	4	Not free					
Tuvalu	94	Free					
Uganda	37	Partly free				Yes	Yes
Ukraine	62	Partly free					

United Arab Emirates	17	Not free					
United Kingdom	94	Free	member	member		Yes	Yes
United States	86	Free	member	member	All		
Uruguay	98	Free			Rio	Yes	Yes
Uzbekistan	7	Not free					
Vanuatu	81	Free					Yes
Venezuela	26	Not free			former Rio		Yes
Vietnam	20	Not free					
Yemen	13	Not free					
Zambia	55	Partly free					Yes
Zimbabwe	30	Not free					

Appendix E: Comparison of WSC and NATO

	WSC	NATO
Mission	Defense alliance	Defence alliance
Geography	World	North Atlantic
Human rights membership requirement	Either EU or Council of Europe model	Loose/ undefined “like-mindedness”
International law membership requirement	No aggression Compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ	Officially no aggression but violations tolerated
Military readiness requirement	Binding military spending target Military operationality assessment	Non-binding military spending target Military operationality assessment
Decision-making	Qualified majority with opt out rights	Consensus
Accountability mechanism	Suppressing voting rights Expulsion	None
Solidarity mechanism	Peacebuilding fund	None
Organs	Council of Heads of State Council of Ministers Secretariat Parliamentary Assembly Court	Council of Heads of State Council of Ministers Secretariat Parliamentary Assembly

Appendix F: Country-by-country Analysis of National Interests

United States

This project could hardly proceed without the participation of the United States, which is still the world's major superpower, and the principal member of the NATO alliance. There have been several American proposals of a similar nature in the past, however. One of the Republican contenders for the U.S. Presidency in 2008, John McCain, proposed the formation of a 'League of Democracies' in order to build an enduring peace based on freedom (McCain 2007). "We Americans must be willing to listen to the collective will of our democratic allies," he said. On the Democratic side, Ivo Daalder, formerly the US Permanent Representative on the Council of NATO, together with James Lindsay, proposed a 'Concert of Democracies' in order to form an "international institution capable of prompt and effective action both to prevent, and where necessary respond to threats to international security" (Daalder and Lindsay 2007). The idea of a Concert of Democracies was also promoted in an authoritative, bipartisan report from the Princeton Project, "*Forging a World of Liberty under Law*" in 2006 (Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006). So it seems there could be support for such ideas from both sides of politics in the United States. The advent of the Trump Administration has thrown all such calculations into doubt, of course, but support for defense alliances remains very strong in Congress.

The main advantage for the US would be the opportunity to share with its partners the burden and responsibility of collective defence. In these times of financial stringency, the cost is a major consideration. In recent years, the astronomical cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, has taken a heavy toll on the US budget, so that the national debt now stands around 100% of GDP. Action to cut costs needs to be taken urgently, and sharing more of the security burden would help enormously. President Trump has shown himself very keen to get the other members of NATO to shoulder more of the burden, and this scheme should help him to do that. A move towards shared responsibility and collective security is clearly the right thing to do in any case.

The United States already has a global web of multilateral and bilateral defense treaties: NATO, ANZUS, the Rio Treaty, and bilateral treaties with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. Indeed, we suggested in the Implementation section that one route to establish the WSC would be to merge them all into a single Treaty. According to the principle "divide and rule", this web of alliances has allowed the United States to dominate each of them. However, as US power continues to decline in relative terms, and as the world becomes more multipolar, the United States will increasingly lose the ability to control world events on its own. For example, the traditionally dominant US role in the Middle East is now overshadowed by Russia, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Building a stronger democratic alliance, with the United States at its core, will become an increasingly interesting proposition. This trajectory would be similar to that of France, which shifted from being a world power on its own to becoming a driving force within a potentially stronger world power, the European Union.

In that context, the United States might entertain a system of qualified majority voting with opt out rights that would allow it to lead the alliance. Because of the weight of its military capability, the opt out rights would provide the United States with a de facto blocking minority vote: many operations would simply not be possible without US participation.

There is currently scant support in the United States to abandon its exceptionalist doctrine on the use of force or to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

European Members of NATO

Europeans have already had long experience with transnational cooperation and supranational authority through the European Union. The Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, is very much in favour of multilateral cooperation, as is the President of France, Emmanuel Macron. An ex-prime-minister of France, Edouard Balladur, has gone so far as to suggest a full union between the USA and Europe to deal with the full range of global foreign policy issues (Balladur 2007). Former leaders of Spain (Aznar 2006) and Denmark (Rasmussen 2016) have promoted the idea of a global league of democracies.

Despite this, the Europeans have been wary of the idea of a 'global NATO', being fearful of being dragged into neo-imperialist adventures under the dominance of the United States. These fears would be answered by the explicit declaration that the new Community would never use force to intervene in an external state unless authorized to do so by the Security Council, or else if it was itself under external attack.

Furthermore, under a qualified majority voting scheme the US would have the largest voice, but by no means a dominant voice, in the Council of the Community. The introduction of qualified majority voting would give more voice to the bigger European countries in the decisions of the Community. The smaller ones would lose voting power, but could be pressured by the United States and the bigger European countries to accept the shift anyway.

Very recently, debate has been revived in Europe as to whether a European army should be set up. Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, called for the EU to create a "common military force", including a command headquarters in Brussels. "We have to take responsibility for protecting ourselves and the European way of life", he said (Juncker 2016). Britain has always been firmly opposed to this idea, but now that the Brexit vote has taken place, this impediment has been removed. The Eastern Europeans are also opposed, being more concerned that the Atlantic alliance, i.e. NATO, should reinforce its presence in the East as bulwark against the perceived Russian threat. NATO has indeed agreed to station four battalions in the Baltic states and Eastern Poland (Stoltenberg 2016). As discussed in the previous section, the idea of an independent European defense should alarm the United States, as the European Union could become yet another rival instead of a force multiplier. There is therefore room for a deal whereby the transatlantic bond would remain the foundation of security in Europe, but power within the alliance would be rebalanced through stronger cooperation among Europeans.

Another objection might be that NATO was set up with the purpose of assuring the security of Western Europe, against the perceived threat of a possible attack from the Soviet Union. Why compromise this purpose by opening the community to outside members, it might be asked? In fact, the Alliance's creation was part of a farseeing broader effort "to serve three purposes: deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration" (NATO 2018). We are proposing a bold new initiative to translate those objectives to the global level, and in particular, to encourage global political integration.

NATO has already been translating its mission to the global level, and Chancellor Merkel and President Macron have both called for new initiatives in global governance to deal with the critical global problems confronting us, so we trust that they would approve a project of

this sort. Very recently, Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, gave a speech at the EU-Australia Leadership Forum, where she spoke of the shared values between Europe and Australia. They are “close partners to build a more cooperative and just global order”, she said, and “the Indo-Pacific region is today also crucial to our own European security” (Mogherini 2018)

Neutrals

Sweden is an example of a neutral state within Europe, and is not currently a member of NATO, although it is a member of the OECD. There has been considerable internal debate, however, as to whether Sweden should in fact join NATO, and this has been fuelled recently by the revanchist behaviour of Russia. If NATO were to become a global security community, acting in non-member-states under the aegis of the United Nations, that might tip the balance and persuade Sweden, Finland, and other neutrals to join the new organisation.

If the neutrals did decide to join in, that would help to eliminate the discrepancy in membership between the OECD and NATO. Already 22 nations are members of both organizations, while 6 neutrals are members of the OECD but not NATO at present

Other US Allies

Australia and New Zealand are already allied with the United States under the ANZUS Treaty, which is seen as the bedrock of their security. They also share intelligence with the United States, Britain and Canada via the ‘Five Eyes’ network. Australia had the largest contingent of troops of any non-NATO nation in the Afghanistan campaign, for example. Japan also has a strong bilateral defence treaty with the United States. Joining the new Community could only strengthen their collective security, and would help to counter the perceived threat of growing Chinese influence in the Pacific. Already there has been some talk of a “NATO of the Pacific” (Thomas 2018).

Emerging Democracies

Most Latin American countries, and India, Indonesia, South Africa, and some other democratic countries in Africa and Asia would likely soon qualify to apply for membership in the Community. They would benefit from the guaranteed security offered by the Community, as well as the pooling of resources and access to WSC expertise. Joining the WSC would give them more influence and the opportunity to play a more active role in global affairs. That is also true of joining the OECD.

To attract these countries, the Community will need to shed the perception of ‘Western imperialism’ that NATO has suffered from in some quarters. Strict respect of the UN authority and genuine democratic power sharing within the Community are necessary in that regard.

Many countries in the ‘global South’ would not immediately qualify to join the Community. They would still wield the same influence as at present through the United Nations, however. Furthermore, the ‘Arab spring’ a few years ago testified to the yearning for democracy among young people worldwide, and we would expect more countries in the global South to join up as their governance systems improve. In Africa, Tunisia, Botswana, and Senegal might already qualify as candidates, along with South Africa, for instance.

Russia and China

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union looked on NATO with fear and suspicion, regarding it as a threat to their very existence. Russia evidently continues to hold that viewpoint today, while China and the US view each other as rivals. But if the new Community could only intervene militarily when authorized by the Security Council to do so, then Russia and China would effectively have a veto over Community operations in the outside world. This should allay their fears over time.

Submitting the Community to UN authority would reaffirm the grand bargain between the great powers that created the United Nations. The Community, Russia and China would have to work together as equal partners to promote peace and security outside of their borders. .

Of course we would look forward to the day when Russia and China do qualify to become full members of the Community. At that point, the struggle for world peace would virtually be over.

These points are discussed in more depth in the section Coping with the global catastrophic risks of political violence.

Other authoritarian states

The Community's military power will make wars against its members very unlikely. By renouncing violence without UN approval, the Community will forsake wars of aggression outside its borders. The only violent conflicts that will continue are conflicts between, or within, states that are not members of the Community. If the world continues to grow more unstable, democratic states will have a strong incentive to join the Community. Only authoritarian states would remain vulnerable to wars. In the end there is no panacea and peace will not be achieved in a day. The Community is meant to act as a pioneer of peaceful resolution of conflicts, but it will not impose itself onto the rest of the world. It must expand by attraction, not coercion.

Endnotes

¹ The five official nuclear powers (Britain, China, France, Russia and United States), the four unofficial ones (India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan) and the emerging one (Iran).

² Cyber warfare may prove hugely destabilizing, as it is technically difficult to determine the true origin of cyber attacks and states have not yet developed the kind of deterrence dialogue and rules of the game that have so far prevented the use of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Cyber attacks and space warfare have the potential of neutering a state's armed forces without killing a single person, which could provoke the target country into a preemptive nuclear attack. Or they could cause mass destruction by themselves if they targeted civilian infrastructure.

³ For example, this month of December 2018 saw the Russian interception of a Ukrainian navy ship, a stock market selloff triggered by worries about the trade war between the United States and China, and a statement by the US Secretary of State that North Korea is not delivering on commitments made at the Trump-Kim summit earlier this year, followed by a North Korean statement that North Korea will not disarm until the US nuclear threat persists.

⁴ There have been four geopolitical realignments since the Second World War, and each one affected the effectiveness of global governance. First, the allied victory gave birth to the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions, a tremendous advance in global governance. Second, the Cold War stalled progress and prevented the United Nations to deliver on its promise. Third, the end of the Cold War and US hegemony enabled new advances in global governance: the World Trade Organization, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (although the US Senate did not ratify the latter two). Fourth, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 followed by the quagmires of Afghanistan and Iraq and then the financial crisis of 2008 diminished the dominance of the United States and gave way to a multipolar world that has not yet found an effective way to govern itself.

⁵ Some democracies, particularly the United States, have nevertheless been involved in wars, something we will discuss later in this proposal (see section "Coping with Global Catastrophic Risks of Political Violence").

⁶ Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on 1 June 2018 (Modi 2018) was remarkable for two reasons. Modi extolled the virtues of a law-based society, openness and pluralism, civilisation founded on compassion, and a rights-based global order where everyone can thrive. He poignantly linked a domestic sensibility with foreign policy. He said of Singapore "and when [nations] embrace diversity at home, they seek an inclusive world outside". The implication was that intolerance and fear of diversity at home is intimately linked with creating an exclusionary world order.

⁷ We understand that, after a democratization wave in the 1990s, the current trend is a retreat of democracy around the world. One can only speculate how long this trend will last. The present proposal would be a counter-acting force, as WSC membership, which would be attractive to many countries as we will argue later, would incentivize countries to strengthen their democratic institutions. Our working group believes that democracy is the best form of government and all nations will eventually espouse it regardless of culture. As long as that is not the case – and even if that never becomes the case – WSC would protect democracies without threatening non-democracies.

⁸ The threat of force does little to prevent Iran and North Korea from pursuing their nuclear programs, and creates risks of its own. Iranians have good reasons to believe that Americans are bluffing: many American analysts themselves acknowledge that air strikes would entail huge costs without permanently destroying Iran's nuclear capabilities (Pollack 2013). North Koreans called the bluff several years ago when they actually developed nuclear weapons. President Trump's unusually bellicose rhetoric has yet to produce tangible results and most analysts continue to doubt that North Korea will abandon its weapons. That rhetoric carries risks of its own. As a US aggression is a real possibility, North Korea is more likely to launch a pre-emptive attack. If on the contrary the United States did not attack after making such threats, its credibility toward foes and allies alike would be diminished. Indeed, the fear of losing face is itself an incentive for President Trump to strike. By contrast, if the United States fully embraced international law, it would no longer appear weak whenever it failed to attack its foes; it would merely follow an international norm like every other country.

⁹ One could imagine exceptional scenarios where a pre-emptive strike might prevent some truly prohibitive cost on America. In the unlikely event such scenarios materialize, the President of the United States would still have the option to use force unilaterally anyway. Breaking the promise of abiding by international law would entail both diplomatic and domestic political costs, and the point of our proposal is precisely to decrease the odds of such decision.

¹⁰ The Kosovo war of 1999 is the only instance where NATO itself (as opposed to its members acting individually or in "coalitions of the willing") participated in an illegal operation. It took place at a time when the norm of

Responsibility To Protect civilians in war zones was emerging. A few years later (2005), that norm was formally adopted by the United Nations, but with an important caveat: humanitarian interventions must be approved by the UN Security Council. NATO has not violated that norm since then. The United States, France and Britain have recently violated it when they struck Syrian facilities involved in the use of chemical weapons, on the contested ground that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is another important norm of international law, which preceded the non-aggression norm.

¹¹ Russia is also on the membership track, but the accession process was interrupted following its invasion of Crimea.

¹² China is also a partner, but it would need much deeper reform to meet the OECD's free market economy membership requirements.

¹³ That is a role similar to that of the G7, G20, G77, BRICSAM, ASEAN and other groupings with overlapping memberships. Note that the OECD already provides the G7 and G20 summits with technical expertise.

¹⁴ The Rio Treaty (its official name is Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) is about as old as the North Atlantic Treaty and initially covered almost all states of the American continent. However, it did not create an intergovernmental organization like NATO, with its own civilian and military infrastructure. It is a pure treaty of mutual defense.

¹⁵ Those six former members are: Cuba as a result of her revolution, Mexico after the US aggression of Iraq in 2003, and four ALBA countries in 2012 (Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Venezuela). ALBA is the Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of our America, an association of Latin American countries created by the late President Chavez and Castro,

¹⁶ Article 1 of North Atlantic Treaty states "The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." Article 7 says: "This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security."